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Abstract: This article considers the role of individual employee voice in regulating the ‘zone 
of acceptance’ within the employment relationship, and examines the extent to which different 
models of collective voice inhibit or foster the operation of individual voice. It focuses 
especially on the role of representatives who deal with job-level grievances who operate 
within contrasted frameworks of collective voice. In one, representation is negotiated with the 
employer, and in the other, it is based on rights established in employment law. The former is 
commonly associated with shop stewards and unions, and the latter with employee delegates 
and works councils. It is argued that whereas in the negotiated model individual and 
collective voice are substitutes, in the rights-based one they are complements. The article also 
considers how this may alter under dual-channel representation based on both unions and 
councils, which is very common in European workplaces. Britain provides an example of the 
negotiated model, and France of both the rights-based and dual-channel models. These ideas 
are tested using data from the 2004 British and French workplace employment relations 
surveys, and confirmed using data from the 1998 surveys. 
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1. Introduction 
Employee voice plays a key part in the governance of the employment relationship. This 
relationship is built upon a deal agreed at the time of hiring, and which is continuously 
adapted thereafter. In exchange for a salary, employees agree to let management direct their 
labor between duties included within their ‘zone of acceptance’, that is, the set of tasks over 
which they accept the employer’s right to manage. This zone is rarely codified in great detail, 
as recognized by economic, legal and psychological theories of the employment contract. It 
relies on goodwill, with both parties free to terminate it should the terms no longer benefit 
them. Use of voice can assist both parties by facilitating changes to the zone of acceptance as 
their needs evolve, and helping to avoid breaches that might otherwise lead to quits or 
dismissals. Individual level voice, that is to say raising issues directly with management, 
contributes to this process because the decision whether to stay or quit is an individual one. 
Yet it does not exist in a vacuum. In many workplaces, it functions alongside collective voice 
institutions, at the job level, with shop stewards and employee delegates, and at the 
establishment and enterprise levels, with unions, and works councils. This article explores the 
relationship between individual and collective employee voice in the workplace concentrating 
especially on the relationship with forms of job-level collective voice because they, more than 
higher-level representatives, deal closely with the detailed problems related to the zone of 
acceptance. It considers two models of collective voice, referred to as ‘negotiation-based’ and 
‘rights-based’. The first is based on voluntary negotiation, and typically comprises shop 
stewards and analogous union-based representatives, and the second, elected personnel 
delegates who often work closely with works councils. It argues that in the negotiation-based 
model, individual and collective voice will generally function as alternatives, as substitutes, 
whereas in the rights-based model, they support, or complement each other’s action. It also 
examines how this relationship is affected by dual-channel representation, such as is common 
in Europe. It also considers the influence of management-led forms of employee voice, such 
as teams, quality circles, goal-setting and performance appraisal whose use has spread in 
recent decades. Some authors have argued that these have been used as substitutes for other 
forms of employee voice, as a basis for a ‘sophisticated non-union model’ (e.g. Kochan, et al., 
1986, Guest, 1987), whereas others have argued that they can complement them (Benson, 
2000, Amossé and Wolff, 2008). 
 
This article examines these questions taking the collective voice institutions of Britain and 
France as examples of these different systems of collective voice. At the time of observation, 
Britain provided an example of negotiated voice, whereas French workplaces provided 
examples of both the rights-based and dual-channel models. The article uses both countries’ 
2004 workplace employment relations surveys, focusing on private establishments with 20 or 
more employees, the population covered by the French survey. The paper examines first the 
underlying theory on the relationship between individual and collective voice in employment 
relationships. Next it presents the data and descriptive differences between the two systems as 
they appear in Britain and France before outlining the statistical method and explaining the 
key variables used. Presentation of the regression results is then followed by a conclusion. 
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2. Theory and hypotheses 
2.1 Voice and the zone of acceptance 
The role of voice in regulating the zone of acceptance occupies a central place in the modern 
employment relationship (Willman et al, 2006, 2009). The early theories of Coase (1937), 
Barnard (1938: Ch 7), and Simon (1951) emphasized the contractual flexibility provided by 
the zone of acceptance, but did not explore how its limits could be policed to the satisfaction 
of both parties, although it was widely recognized that the freedom to quit and effects on 
employee morale discourage extensive abuse. More recently, psychological contract theories 
have likewise emphasized the zone of acceptance and how its breach may be deterred by these 
means, as well as by individual voice between employees and their line-managers (see, 
Rousseau 1995, Conway and Briner, 2005). Such individual voice also plays a key role when 
incumbent employees negotiate idiosyncratic deals, ‘i-deals’, with their managers (Rousseau 
et al. 2006).  
 
It is easy to understand the contribution of individual voice to regulating the zone of 
acceptance. As Williamson (1975) argued, detailed codification of work assignments would 
undermine the very flexibility that appeals to employers. This is also recognized by 
employment law. Under English law, a legally enforceable contract underpins the 
relationship, but as Collins observes, its purpose is to ‘stabilize expectations’ (Collins, 2006: 
139). Likewise, French employment law distinguishes between minor changes to the zone of 
acceptance, which are deemed to be part of the initial deal, and substantial ones that require 
renegotiation. The line between the two is determined in relation to the initial agreement, and 
hence to the intentions of the two parties when contracting (Lyon-Caen and Pélissier, 1988, 
pp. 306ff). Given this open-endedness, the exercise of voice enables both parties to clarify 
whether particular duties fall within the zone of acceptance, and to agree mutually satisfactory 
adjustments without the need to treat each change as a potential breach. 
 
When Freeman and Medoff (1984) first introduced Hirschman’s (1970) theory of exit and 
voice, they focused on individual voice and its collective alternative exercised through unions. 
Other representative forms of collective voice, such as works councils, have also been 
analyzed (e.g. Sadowski et al, 1995). These studies emphasized the benefits of sharing 
information for labor utilization and productivity. Since then, the range of voice channels 
considered has greatly expanded, to include ‘management-led’ channels. For example, Batt et 
al. (2002) examine teams, and non-union dispute resolution. Dundon et al. (2004) examine 
forms of voice ranging from the articulation of individual dissatisfaction, through expressions 
of collective action, to involvement in management decision-making, and they identify 
different channels associated with each: from complaints channels and grievances through to 
quality circles and consultation. There has also been growing interest in individual employee 
voice within goal-setting and performance appraisal, broadening their functions from the 
traditional emphasis on monitoring (Levy and Williams, 2004). Their growth means that their 
potential influence on the operation of individual and collective channels needs also to be 
addressed. The next sections explore the theoretical relationship between individual and 
collective channels, and consider how management-led voice may affect them.  
 
a) Individual voice and its relationship with the other forms  
The effectiveness with which individual employees can exercise voice in their dealings with 
managers depends on the resources at their disposal. In a free labor market, the ultimate 
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sanction for employees, as for their employers, is to terminate the relationship if voice fails to 
bring about mutually satisfactory arrangements. Thus, within individual voice relationships, 
there is always an implicit threat of termination: to quit or to dismiss. For employees, the 
main focus of this paper, its credibility depends upon the ease of finding an alternative job. 
This is influenced by the buoyancy of labor demand, and especially whether employees have 
skills that are easily marketable. Likewise, employees with above average ability for their 
occupation will generally be harder to replace, and so are likely to have a more potent quit 
threat than their peers. 
 
Opportunities for informal discussion with management provide an important channel for 
individual employee voice. To manage their zones of acceptance effectively, employees need 
access to managers who are empowered make decisions. This is generally easier in small 
firms where managerial hierarchies are shorter, and procedures tend to be simpler than in 
large firms. Conversely, long hierarchies, and reliance on formal grievance procedures can 
deprive employees of individual voice. Thus managers’ willingness to deal informally and 
directly is likely to enhance individual voice. It is also generally easier for managerial and 
professional employees to raise issues with those who have decision-making power than for 
employees with only basic skills and educational attainments. 
 
For many workers in different circumstances, individual voice is a risky business. They may 
be penalized as troublemakers, and thus discouraged from speaking out (Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984). In such cases, individual voice fails. For them, the alternatives include 
withdrawal, such as absence or quits, and silence, albeit at the price of growing dissatisfaction 
because they lack influence to contest the divergence between the employer’s changing job 
demands and their own zones of acceptance (Van Dyne et al. 2003). They may also seek to 
exercise voice collectively.  
 
In summary, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H1: Employees’ individual voice will be enhanced by the strength of their outside option, the 
marketability of their skills; 
 
H2: Management’s willingness to deal directly and informally with employees about work 
grievances will enhance individual voice; 
 
H3: Employees who lack voice are more likely to be dissatisfied with their conditions, and to 
withdraw through absence or quits. 
 
b) Two models of collective voice 
When analyzing the position of the zone of acceptance in the negotiated and rights-based 
models, it is helpful to distinguish two levels of collective or representative voice: at job and 
work group level, for example by shop or union stewards and elected employee delegates; and 
at workplace and higher levels, by unions and works councils. As the zone of acceptance 
relates to the jobs of individual employees, and their understanding of the deal underpinning 
the sale of their labor services, the key representatives will quite logically be the stewards and 
employee delegates. The contents of individual jobs are often quite idiosyncratic, and so give 
rise to particularistic grievances, whereas deliberations at the workplace level tend to deal 
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with whole classes of problems. When they deal with individual cases it is usually because 
they raise important general issues. 
 
Freeman and Medoff’s theory was initially framed with the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model of union 
bargaining in mind, whereby unions seek collective bargaining rights with individual 
employers on behalf of certain categories of employees. Their theory does not distinguish 
strongly between job and enterprise level representatives because they are interdependent. 
The stewards’ status and protection from intimidation are underwritten by the union’s 
agreement with management, usually backed up by the possibility of pressure tactics. 
Likewise, the union’s effectiveness in the eyes of its members is bolstered by the activities of 
its shop stewards who can more easily deal with issues closest to the jobs of individual 
employees. 
 
In several continental European countries, alongside the negotiated form, a different set of 
institutions provides collective voice, notably statutory workplace representation by specially 
elected job level representatives and works councils. The former fulfill many of the voice 
functions of shop stewards, taking up individual employees’ grievances with management, 
either on their behalf or jointly with them. In contrast to the voluntary institutions, their status 
is protected by employment law rather than by collective strength, and the employer is legally 
obliged to provide for elections, and to deal with those elected. To distinguish the statutory-
based job-level representatives from their union-based counterparts, this article uses the 
French term ‘personnel delegates’ (délégués du personnel). At the workplace level, collective 
representation, on key issues except pay, is provided through works councils, to which 
employees also have a statutory right, and their powers are established by law. A common 
feature of such models is the presence of an employment size threshold set by law. Thus in 
small plants, personnel delegates will provide the sole statutory representative channel, 
whereas in larger plants there will be both delegates and works councils.  
 
When the state accords such legal rights usually, and quite consistently, it imposes two key 
obligations: a peace obligation and universal coverage of all employees. In their dealings with 
management, both parties should abstain from industrial pressure tactics, and representatives 
should make their services available to all groups in the workplace. As these principles have 
become embedded, new responsibilities have been attributed, notably in the areas of 
employment security and training. Taken together, these features impose very different 
organizational imperatives on these two types of collective voice channels giving rise to 
radically different relationships with individual voice: as a substitute for individual voice in 
the negotiation-based model, and a complement for it in the rights-based model. Key 
influences on the relationship with individual voice concern mobilization, the peace 
obligation, and coverage. 
 
When collective voice depends upon a voluntary agreement, the employer retains the right to 
withdraw. As a result, the union and its stewards have to sustain the employer’s interest by a 
mix of carrot and stick: productivity gains from improved information flows, and the threat of 
collective sanctions. The latter depend upon the union’s ability to mobilize its members to 
maintain recognition and bargaining rights (Crouch, 1982). These organizational imperatives 
include its ability to build coalitions of workers around issues of general concern; to sustain 
itself by recruiting new members; and to manage these coalitions as an effective bargaining 
force (Traxler, 1995). In other words, this form of collective voice has to represent individual 
employees’ problems by a process of ‘interest aggregation’, translating them into issues of 
6 
more general concern around which it can mobilize, and maintain an effective bargaining 
coalition. This may not suit all individuals and groups, especially if they already have 
effective individual voice on account of their marketable skills. However, to maximize its 
collective strength, the union needs to bind such groups into the collective channel because 
otherwise their search for individual solutions will diminish its power, enabling the employer 
to ‘divide and rule’ (Crouch, 1982 Olson, 1971). One manifestation of the tension between 
what Crouch called ‘the drive to combine’ and individual group interest is the smaller wage 
differential in union than in non-union environments (Freeman, 1980, Card et al., 2004). Such 
factors could cause some with marketable skills not only to opt out of collective voice, but 
also to move to non-union firms. 
 
The peace obligation is also critical to the relationship between individual and collective 
voice. This can be seen by considering the zone of acceptance in relation to integrative 
(problem-solving) and distributive discussions1. Many of the adjustments to jobs handled by 
management authority take place through an integrative approach. The purpose of the zone of 
acceptance is that changes in task assignments should be handled by simple communications 
between employees and their managers in an integrative way because they do not affect the 
initial deal over pay and work. There are of course many other, larger, changes that affect 
distributive outcomes and so require renegotiation. Statutory-based delegates and councils are 
well-suited to the integrative questions because they are bound by a peace obligation, whereas 
unions and shop stewards have a comparative advantage for the second, being free of such 
restrictions, although dependent on bargaining power and mobilization. In between, there is a 
large overlapping zone comprising issues that could be resolved by either method. They could 
be treated as distributive questions, or, with a bit of imagination, in a broadly ‘cost neutral’ 
way, that is having only a small or no net effect on distribution (Figure 1). 
 
Take in Figure 1.  
 
In this zone, workers who are well-endowed with individual bargaining power would find 
their own individual voice in competition with collective voice. They can more easily 
negotiate their own special arrangements with management, such as Rousseau’s ‘i-deals’, if 
they can be handled on a one-off, individual, basis. It is often easier to resolve a single issue 
in isolation, and the impact on costs is much smaller than if the concession is extended to all 
other employees, as a union would be inclined to seek. Thus, for employees with sufficient 
market power, individual negotiation would appear the more attractive option, and individual 
and shop steward voice would be in competition. Because personnel delegates are bound by a 
peace obligation, they are under pressure to work with management to find cost neutral 
solutions that do not require pressure tactics, and this will often favor individual adjustments 
and so accommodate individual voice more easily. Their additional attributions on 
employment security and training also promote a mutually supportive relationship with 
individual voice.2 The first restricts managers’ ability to use the dismissal threat to impose 
changes, and the second can assist provision of additional skills required for new duties. 
 
Although stewards and delegates each operate within a framework that protects them, and 
comprises multiple levels of collective voice, it is their action at workgroup level that 
provides employees with help for individual job-related issues. Thus the relationships of 
substitution and complementarity with individual voice should be most intense at that level:  
 
H4a Shop stewards will be negatively related to individual voice; 
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H4b Personnel delegates will be associated with greater individual voice. 
 
The influence of unions and councils on individual voice is mediated through their respective 
job level representatives, and this is shaped by the nature of the ties between them. Stewards 
and unions are strongly interdependent as the former depend upon the union’s ability to 
mobilize pressure for their protection. Both are bound by a shared dependence on negotiated 
recognition, so both can be expected to discourage individual voice. Although councils are 
part of a framework that favors individual voice, their part in the division of labor may cause 
them to have a weak or even negative relationship. They get the conflictual cases that could 
not be resolved at job level, and they tend to work by applying general principles to individual 
cases, both of which imply a strained relationship with individual voice. In this respect, they 
experience some of the same tensions as workplace level union bodies. Thus employees’ 
overall impression could be that delegates are supportive of individual voice, whereas 
councils are less interested. However, unlike unions that provide essential back-up to their 
stewards, delegates have their own independent legal protections. Indeed, in France, in small 
firms below the legal threshold for councils, and even in some medium-sized ones, delegates 
mostly function in the absence of councils. Even when councils are present, it is usually the 
delegates who are in the front-line for individual employee grievances. Thus many employees 
could quite easily associate delegates but not councils with effective support for their 
individual dealings with management. Thus:  
 
H5a Union voice will be negatively related to individual voice;  
H5b Councils may have an indeterminate relationship with individual voice. 
 
The relationship between works councils and individual voice is further strained when they 
operate as a dual channel of collective voice alongside a strong union presence in the same 
workplace. With the dual channel, it would normally be in the employer’s interest to opt for 
grievance channels covered by the peace obligation: to keep distributive and integrative issues 
separate for reasons discussed earlier. In contrast, it is likely to be in the union’s interest to 
emphasize the distributive aspect of employees’ grievances and demands. This would boost 
its prestige in relation to the works council. If the union is strong enough to negotiate a local 
agreement with the employer, it would likely seek to consolidate its position by encouraging 
councils to seek general, solidarity-oriented, solutions to grievances, and so discourage 
individual voice. Thus a sixth hypothesis reinforces H5b: in dual channel workplaces, strong 
union presence will cause councils to inhibit individual voice. 
 
H6: In workplaces where unions and councils provide dual channels, a strong union presence 
will cause councils to have a negative relationship with individual voice. 
 
Dependence on employer agreement compared with universality of representation rights 
accorded by law can affect the coverage of collective voice, and hence the attractiveness of 
individual employee voice. When coverage is uneven, those with marketable skills have good 
reason to maintain their capacity for individual negotiation: their next job may be in a non-
union workplace or in a non-union grade. As a result, they will often be reluctant to pool their 
resources with others for collective voice. Thus, individual voice will tend to be more 
polarized in the voluntary, union, model, being concentrated among those who have the 
necessary individual bargaining power. 
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H7: Individual marketability will have a stronger effect on individual voice in the negotiated 
than in the rights-based model because of the differences in coverage between the two 
systems. 
 
c) Management-led forms of voice 
The spread of management-led forms of employee voice means that one has to take their 
presence into account when exploring the relationship between individual and representative 
voice. As will be seen, they bear no simple relationship with employee voice: much depends 
upon the circumstances. Four main factors are commonly believed to shape the employer’s 
‘demand for voice’, including improved information flows, possible biases in existing 
channels, improved motivation, and high exit costs (Willman et al., 2006). These give a clue 
as to the likely impact on the other forms of voice. Management may suspect that the quantity 
and quality of information flows are subject to different biases under the two regimes. It often 
believes that unions distort information for bargaining advantage and for internal 
organizational reasons, whereas statutory channels can be legalistic. Thus management-led 
channels can often appear better focused on the key issues for the business. Managers may 
also seek to develop voice because they believe it enhances motivation, for example, by 
raising workplace trust. This may be increased by greater management-led communication, or 
it may require management to go further and ‘tie its hands’. In strongly unionized workplaces, 
an agreement with the union would normally provide the necessary commitment, but in 
weakly organized ones, it is possible that employers would prefer to engage with statutory-
based representatives because of their legal status. Finally, where organization-specific skills 
make exit costs high, management may seek to develop its own voice channels in order to 
prevent disagreements from sliding into quits or dismissals. It may do this either because it 
believes existing employee voice is not very effective, or because it fears a hold-up by the 
union, for example, it fears that its investments in training will put it in a weak bargaining 
position. In this context, it is likely that management would consider a works council bound 
by a peace obligation to pose less of a threat than a trade union, which is free to use pressure 
tactics.  
 
Management-led channels are likely to pose the greatest challenge to other voice channels 
when they are relatively independent from direct management control. All four types 
mentioned earlier display this characteristic. In the case of team working, Batt et al (2002) 
observe that it can provide employee voice by increasing involvement and enabling 
dissatisfied employees to voice their concerns, thus provide an alternative to quitting. 
However, its effect depends upon whether teams are ‘consultative’ or ‘substantive’: the first 
including problem-solving groups and quality circles, and the second, practices such as semi-
autonomous groups. They argue that although both forms provide scope for employee voice, 
substantive teams will provide more effective voice because of their greater autonomy.  
 
Grievance procedures provide another form of employee voice which is often management-
led, particularly in the large number of non-union workplaces. As Batt and her co-authors 
observe, these too vary in the degree to which management controls the process. They 
distinguish four kinds: management review, peer review, non-union arbitration and union-
based procedures. Fear of reprisals by management may often discourage use of grievance 
procedures, which Boroff and Lewin (1997) found to be significant even in unionized 
workplaces. Thus, Batt et al. argue that greater independence from management will facilitate 
more effective employee voice, which they measure by reduced quits. Whereas dealing with 
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grievances informally often enhances individual voice, insisting on formal procedures is 
likely to have the opposite effect. 
 
Employee consultative committees (ECCs) are also widely regarded as management-led. 
Although present in both union and non-union workplaces, their use had stalled during the 
period before 2004 (Willman et al., 2009). The same study, which used the British Workplace 
Employment Relations Surveys between 1990 and 2004, also highlights the growth of 
management communication through team briefings and workplace meetings. Like Batt’s 
study, this one used reduced quit rates as an indicator of effective voice, finding lower rates 
associated with more independent forms of voice.3 
 
In recent years appraisal and goal-setting have attracted growing attention as forms of 
employee voice, although one should distinguish their two faces: monitoring and 
involvement. The first deprives employees of voice, whereas the second can enhance it. 
Emphasis on the monitoring function remains strong in the principal-agent literature (see for 
example, Brown and Heywood, 2005, Addison and Belfield, 2008). In contrast, in the HRM 
literature, Cawley et al (1998: 628) concluded their meta-study observing that the monitoring 
approach is no longer consistent with organizations that are moving towards involvement-
oriented climates. There has been a growing emphasis on appraisal for involvement, and on 
the importance of the ‘trial’ or ‘due process’ model in which the effectiveness of goal-setting 
and its motivational functions depend upon employee voice and influence (Folger and 
Cropanzano, 2001, Levy and Williams, 2004). 
 
Thus, the effect of management-led channels on other forms of voice is likely to depend on 
how far management allows them to function independently, and on the circumstances in 
which they operate. From the earlier discussion, it seems likely that management-led channels 
will complement works councils, and compete with the unions, and probably also with 
individual voice. However, empirical research is not conclusive on this. Rivalry, especially 
under the union system appeared to be endorsed by the early empirical research on new forms 
of human resource management. This argued that management-led voice was in competition 
with union-led forms of collective voice, and often sought to undermine them (for example, 
Kochan et al., 1986). However, later work, often drawing on workplace survey data, appears 
to show that management-led and union-based voice channels coexist in the same workplaces, 
possibly for prolonged periods, which casts some doubt on the degree to which they compete 
(Sisson 1993, Benson, 2000).  Evidence from the three French workplace employment 
relations surveys for 1990/92, 1998 and 2004, indicates widespread coexistence of 
representative and management-led channels, without any tendency for one to substitute for 
the others (Amossé and Wolff, 2008).  
 
This theory and evidence indicates an eighth hypothesis: 
 
H8: Management-led channels will have most influence on employee voice when they 
function independently from management, in which case they are more likely to compete with 
the negotiated than the rights model. 
 
3. Britain and France as illustrations of the two collective voice systems 
Examples of these two collective voice systems can be found in Britain and France where 
they are embodied in their respective employment laws. In Britain, the main form of 
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collective voice in the workplace depends upon the employer’s decision to recognize a trade 
union for collective bargaining purposes. Continued recognition also depends upon the 
employer’s decision. The 1999 Employment Relations Act bolstered employee rights for 
union representation, and recognition procedures were strengthened. However, the bar 
required to force an unwilling employer was set high: 50% of the employees in the proposed 
bargaining group should be union members, or 40% and a majority of those voting in a ballot. 
The strong presumption was that voluntary arrangements were to be preferred. Employers 
have long been free to set up employee consultation committees (ECCs) to discuss non-
bargaining issues, and this is quite widely practiced. Consultation rights were strengthened by 
the European Works Council Directive (94/45/EC) enacted in 1999, and the Information and 
Consultation of Employees Regulations Act 2004. The former affects a relatively small 
number of workplaces, in multinational companies, and the latter was not yet in force at the 
time of the survey. 
 
In contrast, in France, both systems operate widely, but not always in the same workplaces. 
Under French employment law, employers of establishments with more than ten employees 
are obliged to organize the election of personnel delegates (délégué du personnel), and those 
with at least 50 employees are similarly obliged to organize elections for a works council 
(comité d’entreprise). The burden of proof is on the employer to show that its employees do 
not want either institution. The delegates’ main function is to represent employee grievances 
to the employer, and they benefit from legal protection against victimization. Although the 
primary function of French works councils is consultation - unions deal with pay 
negotiations - legislation has enabled them to build up considerable powers over a range of 
workplace issues including training and lay-offs.4 Employees also have the right to raise 
grievances directly with management, and delegates often represent those who fail to get a 
satisfactory answer. Such grievances may also relate to pay, for example, if the employee 
believes the wrong pay rate has been applied, or she has been denied an increase. These 
delegates provide the main channel for grievances that in Britain would go though shop 
stewards or grievance procedures. In both countries, many grievances are resolved informally, 
directly with management. 
 
In common with most countries that have works councils, in France, in many workplaces, 
councils and unions coexist. In France, independent unions on paper appear more secure than 
in Britain, They are empowered to negotiate agreements with employers. However, inter-
union competition means that they have to strike a difficult balance between a militant line in 
order to mobilize support, and moderation to avoid being undercut should a more moderate 
union sign the agreement that will bind the employer. There are also legally prescribed, if 
time-consuming, procedures by which employers may terminate collective agreements. Thus, 
despite more extensive rights to negotiate in France than in Britain, unions face a similar need 
to mobilize in order to sustain relations with employers. French unions also have the right to 
appoint shop stewards (délégué syndical) in workplaces, although these will tend to be in 
larger establishments. These stewards are the unions’ local workplace agents, and are closer to 
ordinary employees, but unlike the personnel delegates, they depend on the union’s strength 
for their effectiveness. Unlike delegates, they may also negotiate agreements. 
 
French unions gain a good deal of influence owing to the coexistence of the negotiated and 
statutory voice channels in many workplaces, especially large ones. For example, in large 
workplaces their stewards are ex officio members of the council. This explains why, in 2004, 
46% of French employees worked in establishments with a union presence, yet just 6% were 
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union members. Indeed, whereas membership had remained static over the previous ten years, 
union workplace presence had increased from 37% to 46% (Amossé and Wolff, 2009). Thus 
it would seem that, especially in the private sector, the unions’ low membership and political 
fragmentation make mobilization difficult. As a result, they have to accept the division of 
functions between themselves and delegates and councils. Evidence for the relative prestige of 
the delegates and councils can be seen in the 75% of employees who vote in their elections, 
compared with the 6% of union members. In other words, although unions draw strength from 
working within these institutions, they have to accept the rules governing their operation, 
especially in firms where they are weak. Thus, workplace representation will tend to be 
dominated by the statutory representative institutions in smaller establishments where unions 
are weak, but in large firms where unions have a stronger following they will be able to 
influence how the rights-based channels operate. 
 
Based on the 2004 workplace employment relations surveys of the two countries, Table 1 
summarizes information on their key workplace representative institutions in private 
establishments with 20 or more employees. It shows substantial differences. Voluntary 
institutions in Britain cover a much smaller percentage of establishments compared with 
either statutory or voluntary institutions in France. The percentage of workplaces with a shop 
steward is 10% in Britain compared with France where 72% have a delegate and 37% a shop 
steward. In France, personnel delegates are much more widespread than shop stewards except 
in large workplaces. In Britain, just 18% of establishments had employee consultation, 
compared with 33% in France with statutory works councils (50% for those above the legal 
threshold of 50 employees). These figures are higher if we include medium-sized plants 
where the functions of delegate and council may be merged, 46% and 81% respectively5. A 
similar difference emerges for coverage by plant or company pay agreements, 21% in Britain 
against 64% in France. 
 
TAKE IN TABLE 1 Table 1. Voice institutions in Britain and France in 2004 
 
Turning to individual voice (Table 2), the two countries’ workplace surveys do not provide a 
refined survey instrument to measure different aspects of individual voice. Both use a single 
question in the employee questionnaires. In Britain, employees were asked ‘Ideally, who do 
you think would best represent you in dealing with managers [in this workplace] about the 
following?’, and were offered a menu of replies which included a number of possible 
representatives, from unions to other employees, together with the option: ‘I would be best 
represented by myself’. In France, employees were asked whether they agreed or not with a 
series of statements about representation in their workplace, including ‘Employees can defend 
their own interests directly’. 
 
In both countries, substantial percentages believe that employees can look after their own 
interests in their workplaces. In Britain, about 50% thought they could best represent 
themselves for getting a pay increase and over discipline, and over 60% thought they could do 
so for training and making complaints. In France, just under 40% agreed that employees can 
look after their own interests themselves. In France, the same question was put to the 
employee representative and management respondents. Respectively, 51% and 86% replied 
that employees in their establishments were capable of representing themselves directly. In 
Table 2 it is also possible to see how perceptions of individual voice vary with the presence of 
collective voice. Thus for pay, 34% of employees in British establishments with a recognized 
union reported individual voice, but nearly 60% did so in non-union plants. Likewise in 
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France, 37% of those in plants with representative institutions reported individual voice 
compared with 44% in those without. At first sight, it seems that in both countries they are to 
some degree substitutes. 
 
TAKE IN Table 2. Employees perceived individual voice 
 
Insight into the way the more visible aspects of individual voice work in practice can be 
gleaned from both surveys, although the questions are not directly comparable. Employees’ 
direct access to management to resolve individual grievances is important in both countries. 
In Britain, WERS data show that the great majority of pay, grading and working conditions 
grievances is resolved informally with management outside the formal grievance procedure, 
and without involvement of employee representatives6. Indeed, WERS indicates that the 
influence of employee representatives comes into play mostly within formal grievance 
procedures. Further insight is possible for France because its survey shows both the first and 
second ports of call for certain individual grievances, which illustrates the complementarity 
between individual and representative voice. Table 3 shows management respondent accounts 
for individual grievances relating to working conditions, including work schedules, work pace 
and safety. As in Britain, in the great majority of establishments, employees go first to 
management. In about a fifth they go to delegates or councils, and less than 5% to shop 
stewards. Direct access to management, especially senior management, provides an 
opportunity for individual voice. The frequency with which delegates or councils serve as the 
second port of call illustrates how these channels support individual voice when an immediate 
solution is not forthcoming. Although the question does not distinguish between grievances 
going to the delegates and those to works councils, other information from the survey shows 
that the delegates are the key actors. Considering grievances on working conditions and pay, 
it is two to three times more common for them to go through the elected institutions when 
there are delegates in the workplace than when there is only a council. The key role of the 
delegates is confirmed by information from the employee representatives’ questionnaire 
which shows that it is twice a common for such grievances to be handled by delegates as by 
the council, and they are more likely to obtain a solution, although in the latter case councils 
may well have to deal with cases that eluded both individual voice and representation by the 
delegates.7 
 
Take in Table 3 First and second ports of call for individual grievances relating to 
working conditions: France 
 
4. Statistical method and of key variables 
Because this paper analyses voice models using international comparison, a great deal of care 
has been taken to match variables across the two countries’ surveys (see Appendix Tables 1 
and 2). In practice, the major institutional differences between the two systems mean that 
many similar functions have to be explored with differently phrased questions. As explained 
below, the key measures of individual voice comprise employee perceptions of its 
effectiveness. That said, a key merit of the two surveys is that they combine employer and 
employee questionnaires making it possible to link the employee measures of individual voice 
and marketability to the institutional characteristics of their workplaces. To avoid problems of 
common method variance, the regressions use just the one attitudinal variable from the 
employee survey, all others being of a descriptive nature. Details of the survey questions and 
the variable means are given in appendix. 
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Employee perceptions of individual voice, and of the fairness of their pay are captured from 
the employee questionnaire shown in Table 2 above. Both sets of questions have been used in 
a number of studies looking at employee attitudes towards union voice (for example Belfield 
and Heywood 2004, Bender and Sloane, 1998, and Bryson et al 2004), and on the effects of 
various policies on employee satisfaction (for example, Harley, 2001, Peccei and Lee, 2005) 
and more generally on employee reports about their working conditions (Green, 2008). 
Similar questions were used in 1998 and in 2004. The significance of the results obtained by 
these authors lends confidence to the general validity of the questions.  
 
Nevertheless, employee perceptions of the efficacy of individual voice in their workplaces 
could be upwardly biased. They may overstate its effectiveness to compensate for feelings of 
powerlessness. The variables used in this paper compare individual employees within each 
country so that a generalized upwards bias, and one that differed between the countries, 
should not affect the results. The individual voice questions were also compared with other 
employee influence questions which could not be matched between the two surveys, and they 
were found to be consistent.8 Additional tests of the validity of this measure are discussed 
after the regression results (Table 5). 
 
The marketability of skills strengthens employees’ individual bargaining power so they may 
express individual voice more securely. This can be assessed by a number of indicators. More 
highly educated and professional workers generally have more transferable skills because of 
their high level of analytical and problem-solving knowledge compared with those who learn 
their skills on the job. High ability workers also usually have more outside options. A rough 
indicator can be found in whether someone is paid above the average for their occupation, and 
so earns more than those with similar human capital investments. Recently hired workers, 
measured by short service, generally have more marketable skills, and conversely for those 
with long service. 
 
Ease of access to management may facilitate individual voice. Thus in small firms with short 
managerial hierarchies, more frequent interactions with managers open up opportunities to 
raise issues that would be more difficult in larger workplaces. This effect is captured in part 
by establishment size, although size may reflect other influences as well, such as greater 
formalization. Access also depends upon management’s willingness to deal directly and 
informally, and hence on the design of grievance processes. Their influence can be gauged by 
the frequency of resolving issues outside formal procedures. 
 
The presence of collective voice institutions is based on the management questionnaires 
concerning workplace employee representatives, union stewards and personnel delegates, 
consultation committees, works councils, and coverage by a workplace or enterprise 
collective agreement. Local union organization is measured by presence of a local pay 
agreement. The effect of dual channel representation is captured by identifying workplaces 
with both councils and local agreements. 
 
Management-led voice is measured by the presence of teams, quality circles, workplace 
meetings and performance appraisals. Employee consultation and grievance procedures are 
also often management-led, notably in non-union workplaces, but often involve unions when 
they are present in the workplace. As noted earlier, the effect of management-led on 
individual voice could be positive or negative depending on its independence from 
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management control. This is measured by interactions with representative institutions on the 
assumption that their presence will enhance independence.  
 
Some control variables are needed to capture the effects of different types of work situation 
and industries. More autonomous and more technically demanding work will often involve 
greater delegation and hence more employee discretion over task assignments, and hence 
greater scope for individual voice. These effects are partially captured by job autonomy and 
use of computers, based on the management questionnaire. Other variables exist in the two 
surveys, but could not be matched. Large investments in training raise the cost of exit. These 
are captured by employer training expenditures, and payment of ‘efficiency wages’ (paying 
above the average for the sector). On the other hand, high turnover and absence rates signal 
low exit costs as high costs would induce management to adopt policies to cut absence and 
turnover. The British survey provides direct measures of these, whereas the French one 
provides indirect measures only, asking employers whether they experienced problems of 
recruitment and absence for different occupational groups. Employment size is represented by 
categorical variables chosen to reflect the various legal thresholds: 50 employees for a 
council, and 50-199 for combining delegates and councils into a single channel (délégation 
unique). Nine sectoral groups were matched, and sectoral dummies were used taking 
manufacturing as the benchmark. 
 
5. Regression results  
The regression results show that the marketability of employees’ skills is associated with 
stronger individual voice in both countries (Tables 4a and 4b). The result is much sharper in 
Britain than in France, for reasons that will be examined shortly. In Britain, higher levels of 
education, being paid above the average for one’s occupation, and holding professional or 
technician qualifications all boost perceived voice. Possessing organization specific skills, as 
indicated by long service diminishes perceived individual voice. These indicators of 
individual marketability hold their strength and significance as representative and 
management-led voice measures are added, as they do when establishment characteristics and 
sector are included. In France, being a managerial or professional employee is associated with 
greater individual voice when size and sector are included, but the other measures are not 
significant. These results provide strong support for hypotheses H1 in Britain, but somewhat 
less so in France. 
 
 
TAKE IN Table 4. Determinants of perceived employee individual voice in Britain and 
France 2004 
 
Strong support for the influence of job-level representation on individual voice emerges from 
both countries’ data. Union-based shop stewards are negatively associated with individual 
voice, supporting hypothesis H4a. Personnel delegates are positively associated with 
individual voice, confirming hypothesis H4b. Because multiple representation channels 
increase with establishment size, the analysis for France was repeated in small, medium and 
large workplaces (Appendix Table 3). In small workplaces, stewards and delegates maintain 
their respective influences on individual voice, and delegates continue to do so in medium-
sized ones. It is difficult to estimate separate effects in large establishments because all 
collective channels coexist in the great majority of them, as shown in the right-hand columns 
of the table). Including establishment size interactions for delegates and stewards in France 
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considerably strengthens both coefficients, while maintaining their respective signs. Such 
interactions were not statistically significant in Britain. The interactions show that both types 
of job level representatives have less influence on individual voice in larger plants, the 
reasons for which become apparent in the next paragraph. 
 
Turning to workplace level, in Britain, coverage by a union agreement is associated with 
lesser individual voice, supporting H5a. In France, the widespread use of dual channels is 
likely to affect the impact of both councils and unions on individual voice. For this reason the 
results are shown separately for establishments with the dual channel, and for those with 
either councils or union agreements only. The reference category is establishments without 
workplace level channels. As anticipated, councils in plants without agreements have no 
statistically significant effect on individual voice, consistent with H5b that employees would 
look to the delegates rather than the more remote councils for support on individual issues. 
Union agreements in plants without a council also have no statistically significant effect on 
individual voice, whereas a negative effect was anticipated (H5a). Lack of significance may 
be due in part to the small numbers of such establishments, and that those covered by a union 
agreement, but lacking either a council or delegates, are mostly small, so that union resources 
would be greatly stretched. In contrast, the strongly negative and significant coefficient on 
councils with local union agreements is consistent with hypothesis H6 that strong unions exert 
a solidaristic influence over councils’ dealings with individual voice. Thus, in dual channel 
establishments, the unions’ anticipated negative influence on individual voice seems to be 
transmitted mainly through their joint action with councils. Without councils (and delegates), 
unions are mostly too weak for employees to consider renouncing their individual voice, 
hence the non-significant coefficient. 
 
As an experiment, a similar analysis was undertaken distinguishing delegates in workplaces 
with and without local agreements. In both cases, their association with individual voice 
remained strongly positive. Compared with councils, they appear to enjoy greater 
independence from union pressures. Thus, there appears to be good support for the arguments 
about the roles of the four collective channels in relation to individual voice. Nevertheless, 
some caution is needed for the workplace level institutions, because dual channel 
representation is the norm in large establishments. This means that the statistical tests often 
hinge on the minority of large workplaces with weaker representation. This problem does not 
arise for delegates and stewards because they are separately present in many small 
workplaces, hence the robustness of the estimates relating to them. 
 
Grievance processes provide insight into the channels for individual employee voice. In both 
countries, handling grievances informally, outside formal procedures, appears to strengthen 
individual voice. For Britain informality was interacted with size to factor out the effects of 
greater formalization in large workplaces. In France, informal grievance handling is captured 
by whether employees have direct access to senior managers in order to sort out work 
problems. These results support H2 that greater access to management boosts individual 
voice. In contrast, taking grievances through formal channels often deprives employees of 
direct access to senior management, hence the negative coefficient on formal procedures in 
Britain.9  
 
Turning to the management-led forms of voice (H8), the most striking result under both 
systems is their generally small effect on individual voice: mostly not statistically significant. 
This may be due partly to difficulty of identifying their independence from management using 
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the data available. Interactions with collective voice channels were computed, in the 
expectation that management-led channels operate with greater independence in the presence 
of collective voice (available from the author). In Britain, mostly these proved non-
significant. The exception was appraisal, where a positive and significant interaction suggests 
that it may enhance individual voice if local union influence reduces management control. 
The negative coefficient on employee consultation in Britain seems also to reflect the degree 
of management control, even in unionized workplaces, as indicated by a non-significant 
interaction with local agreements.  
 
Among the workplace characteristics, high rates of absence were associated with low 
individual voice in Britain. Absence is often interpreted as a form of silent protest (Edwards, 
1979) hence indicating a lack of voice. Turnover was negative but not significant. In France, 
there was no significant effect of either variable, but this may be due to reliance on indirect 
measures. A high cost of turnover, signaled by employer provided training, was positive and 
significant for Britain, and positive, but not significant for France. In neither country did the 
somewhat crude indicators of work organization, job autonomy and use of computers, appear 
to show much effect on employee individual voice. In both countries, individual voice was 
strongest in small establishments, and declined steadily as size increased. 
 
Several robustness checks were carried out. The first concerns whether the results can be 
replicated for other years. In neither country has workplace representation been static, and it 
could be that the 2004 data simply reflect unusual conditions in that year (Amossé and Wolff, 
2008). For this reason, the regression analysis was repeated using the results of the 1998 
surveys for the two countries. Most of the variables could be matched owing to considerable 
stability in the design of the two surveys. The key results were confirmed: in Britain, union 
stewards and local union agreements maintained their negative relationship with individual 
voice, and in France, union stewards were again found to bear a negative relationship with 
individual voice, and personnel delegates, a positive one. In all cases, the relationships were 
statistically significant (Appendix Table 4). The one exception concerns the solidaristic 
influence of unions that prevailed over works councils leading to lesser individual voice in 
dual-channel establishments. In 1998, this was not statistically significant. This may be 
because the influence of unions over councils in large establishments has grown in recent 
years (Amossé and Wolff, 2009), and that 1998 was at an earlier stage in this trajectory. 
 
The second check concerns the effect of employment size. In France, workplace size is the 
deciding criterion on the right to representation by personnel delegates and works councils. In 
addition, much of the variation in representational patterns is related to size. This raises the 
possibility that the apparent impact of the statutory model on individual voice is spurious: 
individual voice is strongest in small units, and it just happens that this is where personnel 
delegates are most strongly implanted. However, the analysis by size (Appendix Table 3) 
shows that the difference between stewards and delegates is to be found also in small 
establishments, and the negative and significant coefficient on councils with local union 
agreements was sustained in medium-sized workplaces. Non-significance in small and large 
establishments could be anticipated: councils and local agreements are the exception in small 
establishments below the legal threshold, and in large ones, multiple channels make separate 
estimation difficult. 
 
Thirdly, one has to ask why the effects of the selected variables should be generally much 
stronger and more significant in Britain than in France, and explain so much more of the 
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overall variance individual voice, 15% as compared with 3% (Table 4, pseudo r2). The main 
reason is that the number of employee respondents in each workplace was much smaller in 
France than in Britain, averaging respectively 3 and 15, leading to larger standard errors in the 
dependent variable. Note that the unit of observation in Table 4 is the employee. As a check, 
the same equation was run, this time with the establishment as unit of observation, using 
establishment means of individual voice for workplaces at least five employee respondents 
and substituting the establishment’s occupational composition for employee occupation 
(details available from the author). This cuts the sample establishments by 10% in Britain, but 
by 85% in France, although the size ranges remain fairly evenly represented. Now the full 
equations of Table 4 for Britain and France explain respectively 37% and 25% of the 
variation in perceived employee voice. The analysis confirms the negative coefficients on 
stewards and union agreements for Britain, although in France, the effect of job level 
representation proves more robust than that of workplace level.10 Similarly, for 1998, when 
the regressions are run on establishment means instead of individual employee data, the 
analysis confirms the direction of the key relationships with individual voice, and as in 2004, 
the variance explained increases to 38% and 27% respectively in Britain and France 
(Appendix Table 4). 
 
The lesser effect of individual marketability upon individual voice (H7) in France may partly 
reflect measurement differences, but it is also consistent with the underlying argument of this 
paper. First, the more extensive coverage of the statutory voice institutions in France than in 
Britain means that when workers change jobs, there is a much higher probability (70% as 
against 33%, Table 1) that they will enter another workplace that provides collective voice. 
As a result, they are less dependent on maintaining their personal capacity for individual 
negotiation. Secondly, as a result of the employment protection powers of works councils, 
lesser use can be made of dismissal threats in order to police the zone of acceptance. This is 
consistent with the OECD’s employment protection index (EPL) which situates France at one 
extreme and Britain at the other.11 It is also consistent with a lower proportion of short tenure 
employees in France compared with Britain, as shown by mean job tenures in Appendix 
Table 1, and confirmed by the OECD’s labor force survey based estimates. In 2004 in Britain, 
35% of employees had less than three years service compared with 24% in France 
(OECD.stat). In other words, greater employment stability in France is associated with lesser 
use of quit and dismissal threats to sustain individual voice, and a lesser premium on 
individual marketability than in Britain. This situation would be acceptable for French 
employees owing to the effectiveness of personnel delegates in supporting their individual 
dealings with management. Their action can also explain why the levels of perceived 
individual voice should be roughly similar in both countries despite different constraints on 
the use of dismissal and quit threats (Table 2). 
 
Finally, a number of tests of the validity of the individual voice measure were carried out. 
First, might greater scope for individual voice make employees more satisfied with the pay 
for their work and less likely to quit (H3)? Table 5 regresses pay satisfaction on the actual and 
predicted values of effective individual voice. For each country, the top two rows show the 
effect of perceived individual voice on feeling fairly paid, without and with controls. Because 
of possible halo effects between feeling fairly paid and perceived voice, the analysis was 
repeated using the predicted values of voice from the full variable equations in Table 4. 
Second, it is possible to compute quit rates from the British but not the French survey, and the 
middle section of Table 5 shows the regression of establishment quit rates on mean individual 
voice for establishments with at least ten employee respondents. The results show that higher 
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levels of individual voice are indeed associated with lower quit rates. The third test uses the 
idea that employees can obtain a greater return on individual voice in workplaces with greater 
internal pay inequality and where firms can derive rents from their dominant product market 
position12. The reward policies provide scope for such negotiation, and the market power 
signals the employer’s ability to pay. For France, where suitable earnings data are available, it 
is possible to use the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile hourly earnings, and whether the 
firm holds more than 50% of its product market. Both variables are positive and significant, 
adding further confidence to the interpretation of the individual voice measure. 
 
TAKE IN Table 5. Satisfaction with pay and individual voice 
 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, what can be said about the determinants of individual employee voice, and its 
relationship with representative voice? In both the negotiated and the statutory systems of 
collective voice, two key factors are having a viable outside option and informal access to 
managers who can make decisions, at least as judged by the employees who would exercise 
voice. In both models, the job-level representatives play a key role in helping employees 
manage their zone of acceptance, although they appear to do so in contrasted ways. The 
negotiated model inhibits individual voice because stewards have to translate individual 
concerns into collective ones, whereas the statutory one enhances it because delegates are 
more at liberty to deal with each case on its individual merits. Moving to the workplace level, 
in the negotiated system, union organization, as reflected by having a collective agreement, 
tends to inhibit individual voice. It was argued that this stems from the need to mobilize in 
order to sustain collective strength vis-à-vis the employer. In the rights-based system, one 
would expect councils to have a less pronounced effect than the job level delegates because 
the latter play the key front-line role, and they are not dependent on councils in the way that 
stewards depend upon their unions. Employment law rather than mobilization sustains their 
action. Examples of workplaces with councils with and without union agreements can be 
found in France, and it could be argued these approximate to the ideal-type rights-based and 
the dual-channel systems. In the council-only workplaces, the effect on individual voice is 
non-significant, whereas in the dual-channel workplaces it appears that the unions’ solidaristic 
orientation prevails over the councils, at least in relation to individual voice. Nevertheless, 
some caution is needed because of the relatively small numbers of council-only workplaces, 
and the possibility that they are in some other sense not typical. 
 
Management-led forms of voice, on the evidence of the two countries in this paper, do not 
appear to have much effect on individual voice either to enhance it or to diminish it. The main 
exception relates to grievance procedures, and how they affect individual access to senior 
managers. The negative coefficient on formal grievance procedures in Britain, it was 
suggested, reflects how they can restrict the informal access and so restrict individual voice. 
The lack of association between individual voice and management-led forms does not 
preclude other benefits that management may derive from them, such as information and 
motivation observed in other studies. 
 
Before concluding that the logics of mobilization and representation rights explain the 
different effects of the voluntary and statutory models on individual voice a number of 
possible counter arguments should be considered. The first is that the difference between the 
countries may reflect the influence of variables omitted from the surveys, such as national 
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differences in the economic environment. This would not explain why the job level stewards 
and delegates in France have their contrasted effects, this being one of the most robust 
findings in the regressions. The second is that the difference between the British and French 
results may simply reflect the predominance of non-union workplaces in the British private 
sector. However, while this could explain the greater influence of marketability in Britain, it 
would not explain why shop stewards have a negative association with individual voice in 
both countries.  
 
The findings revealed by the employee questionnaires for Britain and France shed new light 
on individual voice within employment relationships and show that it is much more extensive 
than is often supposed, even within environments where collective voice is fairly developed. 
They suggest also that the dichotomy between no voice and collective voice needs to be 
reviewed, and that management-led voice has not been very effective at fostering greater 
individual voice. Beyond their intellectual interest, these findings also raise questions about 
employee well-being. Does it matter that employees in the voluntary regime should be so 
much more dependent on individual voice than their counterparts in the statutory one? The 
evidence of this paper suggests that those who lack marketable skills and are in workplaces 
without representation may well be faced with the stark choice between languishing in silence 
and the greater risks entailed by absence and quits. 
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8. Endnotes
                                                 
1 I am grateful to one of the referees for suggesting this line of analysis. 
 
2 In France, in smaller establishments without works councils, personnel delegates assume many of the functions 
relating to employment security and training.  
 
3 The authors found that establishments with union and dual voice channels had consistently lower quit rates than 
those with either exclusively non-union channels or no formal channels at all (Willman et al. 2009: 110-112). 
 
4 In France, the employer chairs the works council, thus making it unsuitable for industrial action, and so 
provides a functional equivalent of the peace obligation. 
 
5 Under French employment law, establishments with 50-150 employees may merge the delegate and councils 
into a single body encompassing both sets of rights, the ‘délégation unique’. 
 
6 Grievances dealt with ‘informally’ refer to establishments that report a grievance of a particular kind has been 
raised during the past 12 months, but which did not deal with any grievances through their formal procedure. By 
implication, these were dealt with outside the procedure, that is, informally. Thus, 24% of establishments 
reported grievances relating to pay, but of these, only 6% reported use of the formal grievance procedure, 
implying that 18 percent dealt with them informally. For working conditions, the figures were 16% and 10% 
respectively for informal and formal channels. The WERS variables used were htype and hprocedu. 
 
7 This can be done by examining employee representative replies relating to the volumes of grievances and the 
rates of resolution respectively for delegates and councils. Individual grievances on working conditions and 
absence of a promotion or pay increase were roughly twice as frequent for delegates as for councils, whereas for 
dismissals which involve application of established procedures, the rates were about the same. The attractiveness 
of the delegate channel is also evident in the higher rates of resolution compared with councils: 51% compared 
with 41%, although the latter may reflect that councils get the more difficult cases.  
 
8 In Britain, the questions from the employee questionnaire related to their overall satisfaction with involvement 
in decision-making in their workplace (QB9), and how good were their managers at allowing employees or their 
representatives to influence decisions (QB8c). In France, employees were asked whether their fear of losing their 
job motivated them and whether job insecurity held them back in their work (Q12, Q13). In both cases, the 
questions were included in a version of the equation used in Table 3, and obtained the expected sign and were 
significant. 
 
9 There is a positive interaction with union presence, not included in the Table 4a analysis, which signals 
increased likelihood that such procedures are joint, which is consistent with Batt’s findings. 
 
10 Despite the greatly reduced sample, stewards maintained their negative, and delegates, their positive 
relationships with individual voice, although only that for stewards is significant. The presence of a council with 
a union agreement had a negative but non-significant relationship. The major difference compared with Table 4 
was a positive, significant, coefficient for local agreements. This was caused by the restricted sample, as was 
shown by running the corresponding employee regressions on the same reduced sample of establishments. 
 
11 For 2004, the OECD’s employment protection legislation index (EPL version 2) stood at 1.1 for the UK and 
2.85 for France, placing the two countries at either pole: France fifth from the top and the UK fourth from the 
bottom out of 33 industrial countries. 
 
12 This test was suggested by Barbara Petrongolo.and Joern-Steffen Pischke. Suitable data on within workplace 
pay inequality were not available for Britain, and the market power measures were positive but not significant.  
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9. Tables and Charts 
Table 1. Voice institutions in Britain and France in 2004 
(% of all establishments (private with >=20 employees)  
 Britain France 
 %   % 
Shop steward:   
Employment size 
                         >=20 
                         20-99 
                         >=100 
 
 
10.1 
5.6 
34.1 
Delegate:  
Employment size 
                   >=20 
                   20-99 
                  >=100 
 
Steward:   >=20 
                   20-99 
                  >=100 
 
Delegate or steward >=20 
 
 
72.0 
67.9 
93.4 
 
37.2 
29.1 
80.1 
 
73.8 
Employee consultation 
committee 
>=20  
20-49 
50-99   
>=100 
>=50 
 
Consultation +  
- Local agreement 
- No local agreement 
 
 
 
18.4 
8.7 
24.8 
51.0 
36.4 
 
 
7.0 
11.4 
Works council 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Council + 
- Local agreement 
- No local agreement 
  
 
 
33.1 (45.7) 
19.1 (25.4) 
44.4 (72.5) 
74.1 (92.3) 
51.0 (81.2) 
 
 
26.2 (35.7) 
6.8 (10.1) 
Coverage by a collective 
agreement on pay (at least 
some employees) 
>=20 
20-99 
>=100 
Agreement + 
No consultation committee 
 
 
 
21.1 
17.6 
40.0 
 
14.1 
Establishment pay 
agreement negotiated in 
past 3 years  
 
 
 
Agreement + 
No works council 
 
 
 
64.0 
60.4 
83.0 
 
37.8 
 
Collective representation 
(ECC, steward or coll agt) 
Employment size: 
Estabs>=20  
Estabs>=50  
 
 
 
32.7 
49.2 
Representative institutions: 
(Works council or delegate) 
 
 
 
75.2 
91.6 
 
Source: WERS and REPONSE 2004, Management questionnaires, private establishments with >=20 employees, 
using establishment weights. France: figures in parentheses for councils include ‘délégation unique’ in which the 
functions of delegates and councils are merged, which the law allows for establishments with 50-199 employees. 
These represent 13% of private establishments with >=20 employees. Figures for delegates include délégation 
unique. 
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Table 2 Employees’ perceived individual voice 
 
(a) Great Britain (employee respondents) 
 
 All estabs 
Estabs with a 
recognised TU 
Estabs with no 
recognised TU 
% of employees replying ‘I would be 
best represented by myself’ on the 
following issues: 
% % % 
Getting increases in my pay 49.9 33.9 59.8 
Getting training 68.9 67.3 69.9 
If I wanted to make a complaint about 
working here 
60.9 51.1 67.0 
If a manager wanted to discipline me 47.4 32.9 56.5 
 
 
(b) France: (employee, employee representative, and management respondents) 
 
 Employee respondents Employee 
representative 
Management 
respondent 
Employees 
(in this 
workplace) 
can defend 
their own 
interests 
directly. 
Estabs with 
no 
employee 
rep 
institutions 
Estabs with 
elected 
employee 
rep 
institutions 
All estabs   
 % % % % % 
Disagree 
strongly 
17.2 26.9 26.0 19.5 2.3 
Disagree 19.2 24.8 24.2 28.3 10.3 
Neutral 19.2 11.1 12.0 0.7 1.7 
Agree 22.9 26.1 25.8 30.5 46.8 
Agree 
strongly 
21.5 11.0 12.0 21.0 38.9 
Total agree 44.4 37.1 37.8 51.5 85.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Private establishments with ≥20 employees. Percentages based on employee weights. 
Employee respondents: Great Britain N=12,942; France, N=7132. For details of voice 
questions, see Appendix Table A2. France: 'Elected representative institutions' (col 3 heading) 
comprise delegates and works councils. 
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Table 3 First and second ports of call for individual grievances relating to working 
conditions: France 
 
 First port of call % of 
estabs 
Second port of call Of 
which 
% 
   No further discussion 42 
 Senior Management 25 Mid-Mgt  34 
   Delegate/Council 16 
   Colleague 6 
     
   Senior Mgt  52 
 Middle Management 48 No further discussion  9 
   Delegate/Council 26 
   Health & safety cttee 4 
Individual grievance 
on working conditions 
    
   Senior Mgt 26 
 Delegate/Council 18 Mid-Mgt 51 
   Health & safety cttee 11 
   Shop steward 5 
     
   Senior Mgt  16 
 Shop steward 3 Mid-Mgt  29 
   Delegate/Council  41 
   Health & safety cttee 8 
 
Q 8.6a: in this establishment, to whom do employees go first for individual problems relating to 
working conditions (safety, work pace, working time)? (Management respondents). 
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Table 4a. Determinants of perceived employee individual voice in Britain 2004  
Perceived individual voice  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  
Employee individual voice 
supports           
Years of education  0.020  ****   0.026  **** 0.028  **** 0.032  **** 
Pay> average for my occupation  0.284  ****   0.359  **** 0.298  **** 0.299  **** 
Mgr/Professional  0.825  ****   0.811  **** 0.877  **** 0.883  **** 
Technician  0.455  ****   0.446  **** 0.518  **** 0.494  **** 
Admin/sales  0.182  ****   0.175  **** 0.249  **** 0.232  **** 
Semi/unskilled manual  -0.271  ****   -0.290  **** -0.188  **** -0.176  **** 
Length of service (log)  -0.106  ****   -0.064  **** -0.072  **** -0.062  **** 
Representative voice           
Union steward   -0.473  **** -0.366  **** -0.366  **** -0.359  **** 
Estab level pay agreement    -0.262  **** -1.535  **** -1.432  **** -1.476  **** 
Grievance handling           
Formal procedure     -0.418  **** -0.254  ** -0.343  **** 
- and coll agt     1.301  **** 1.194  **** 1.188  **** 
Grievances handled informally      0.463  **** 0.378  ** 0.309  * 
 - informality *  size     -0.076  **** -0.059  * -0.047  - 
Management-led voice           
Teams     -0.082  - -0.077  -   
Quality circles     0.017  - 0.000  -   
Workplace meetings     0.012  - 0.043  -   
Appraisal scheme     -0.035  - 0.051  -   
Consultative committee     -0.337  **** -0.300  ****   
Job characteristics           
Job autonomy        0.142  -   
Use of computers        -0.053  -   
Establishment characteristics           
Training intensity       -0.104  -   
Plant pay > industry average        0.076  *   
Turnover rate/problems        -0.164  -   
Absence rate/problems        -0.871  **** -0.977  **** 
           
Constant  -0.489  - 0.244  - 0.166  - 0.168  - 0.138  - 
           
Size dummies no  no  no  yes  yes  
Sector dummies no  no  no  yes  Yes  
           
Pseudo r2 0.0869  0.0486  0.1460  0.1610  0.1491  
No of observations 12881  12942  12238  11862  12881  
Clusters 882  882  836  807  882  
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Table 4b. Determinants of perceived employee individual voice in France 2004  
 
Perceived individual voice  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef  Coef  
Individual voice supports             
Years of education  -0.022  ****   -0.015  * -0.012  - -0.012  - -0.015  * 
Pay> average for occ -0.118  ****   -0.061  - -0.024  - -0.028  - -0.036  - 
Mgr/Professional  0.052  -   0.104  - 0.208  **** 0.217  **** 0.181  **** 
Technician  -0.051  -   -0.019  - 0.041  - 0.044  - 0.020  - 
Admin/sales  -0.039  -   -0.068  - 0.004  - 0.007  - -0.003  - 
Semi/unskilled manual  0.018  -   0.024  - 0.029  - 0.030  - 0.035  - 
Other occupations 0.090  -   0.064  - 0.133  - 0.143  * 0.140  * 
Length of service (log)  -0.022  -   0.001  - -0.003  - -0.003  - -0.003  - 
Representative voice             
Union steward   -0.202  **** -0.195  **** -0.131  **** -0.958  **** -1.016  **** 
Personnel delegate   0.196  **** 0.195  **** 0.197  **** 0.932  **** 0.704  **** 
Merged PD & CE   0.038  - 0.027  - 0.083  - 0.067  - 0.065  - 
Council & no local agt   -0.103  - -0.108  - -0.038  - -0.126  - 0.004  - 
Council & local agt   -0.244  **** -0.223  **** -0.144  * -0.527  (11%) -0.141  * 
Local agt/ no council   0.023  - 0.045  - 0.041  - -0.052  - 0.033  - 
Grievances             
Grievances handled informally    0.118  **** 0.119  **** 0.110  **** 0.103  **** 0.103  **** 
Management-led voice             
Teams     -0.060  - -0.050  - -0.053  -   
Quality circles     0.040  - 0.024  - 0.020  -   
Workplace meetings     -0.064  - -0.057  - -0.049  -   
Appraisal scheme     -0.108  *** -0.029  - -0.027  -   
Job characteristics             
Job autonomy        -0.069  - -0.072  -   
Use of computers        -0.109  - -0.125  *   
Establishment characteristics             
Training intensity       0.127  - 0.129  -   
Plant pay > industry aver       -0.035  - -0.030  -   
Turnover rate/problems        -0.029  - -0.030  -   
Absence rate/problems        -0.034  - -0.029  -   
29 
Perceived individual voice  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef  Coef  
Interactions: 
Delegate*size         -0.179  **** -0.123  ** 
Steward*size         0.185  **** 0.199  **** 
             
Council/Agt status *size No  No  No  No  Yes  No  
Size dummies No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sector dummies No   No   No   Yes  Yes  Yes  
             
Pseudo r2 0.0045  0.0153  0.0202  0.0277  0.0303  0.0282  
No of observations 7132  7616  7094  7073  7073  7123  
Clusters 2522  2568  2507  2498  2498  2519  
 
Unit of observation: employees. Probit estimates, based on clustered robust standard errors allowing standard errors to vary between sampling units. Size categories: 
20-49, 50-99, 100-199, 200-499, 500-999, >=1000. Omitted categories: skilled manual, size 20-49 and manufacturing. Interactions between log size and 
representative coverage in Britain were not significant, and so not included. They were included for France because of the more complex relationships 
between representative institutions and size. 
 Significance: **** 1%; *** 2%; ** 5%; * 10*. Private sector establishments with 20 or more employees.  
30 
 
 
 
Table 5. Individual voice: pay satisfaction, quits, and pay inequality within 
establishments 
 
Perceived individual voice 
Regression  
Coefficients 
Sig R2 n clusters 
 
GB: pay satisfaction    Employees  
Actual values (no controls) 0.264  **** 0.0081 12,942 882 
Actual values (controls) 0.181  **** 0.0432 11,816 807 
Predicted values 0.634  **** 0.0094 11,816 807 
 
France: pay satisfaction      
Actual values (no controls) 0.415  **** 0.0187 7,625 2,571 
Actual values (controls) 0.449  **** 0.0613 7,123 2,519 
Predicted values 4.304  - 0.0411 7,123 2,519 
 
GB: Voluntary quits    
Establish- 
ments  
No controls -0.0956 *** 0.0202 688 Na 
Controls included -0.0908 ** 0.2685 688 na 
 
France    Employees  
Establishment hourly pay dispersion  
p90/p10 all employees in estab 0.0015 * 0.0317 5843 2069 
Degree of competition  
(supplies >50% of product market) 0.1115 ** 
Same  
regression 5843 2069 
 
Notes: Pay satisfaction: probit coefficients, using a binary pay satisfaction variable, with and 
without the full set of Table 3 variables. The predicted values were derived from the Table 4 
equations, excluding interactions. Robust standard errors were allowed to vary between 
establishments (clusters). 
Quits: OLS regression of the per cent of resignations on establishment mean values of 
perceived individual voice; limited to establishments with at least ten employee respondents. 
Controls included occupational composition, log seniority and employment size, and sector. 
Data on resignations are not available in Réponse. Robust standard errors.  
Hourly earnings: for France provided for 80% of sample establishments by the DARES from 
the DADS earnings series. Probit coefficients were computed by including them in the same 
regressions as in Table 4, including sector controls. 
Significance: **** 1%; *** 2%; ** 5%; * 10%. 
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Figure 1. Integrative and distributive approaches to adapting the zone of acceptance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task assignments 
covered by zone 
of acceptance 
Distributive 
Cost neutral 
solutions available 
Changes require 
renegotiation 
Integrative 
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10. Appendices 
 
11. Appendix: The two surveys 
WERS (Workplace Employment Relations Survey) and REPONSE (Relations 
Professionnelles et Négociations d’Entreprise) are surveys are based on representative 
samples of establishments in Great Britain and France. The surveys were carried for the 
Department for Trade and Industry (DTI), Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
(ACAS), the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and the Policy Studies Institute 
(PSI) in Britain, and the DARES of the Ministry of Labor in France.  
 
The two surveys share the same general design, comprising information collected by 
questionnaire from the establishment’s management, usually the top manager or the human 
resources manager, from employee representatives and from a sample of individual 
employees within each establishment. For the sample used in this paper, that is private 
establishments with 20 or more employees, in Britain and France, the samples included about 
1,200 and 2,800 establishments respectively. In both countries, the employee questionnaire 
obtained about 12,000 replies, however, in France, only two thirds could be linked to 
establishments.  
 
The analysis in this paper uses the establishment and employee weights provided to adjust for 
sample stratification and a measure of non-response. More information about the surveys can 
be found in Kersley et al (2006) for WERS 2004 and in Amossé et al (2008) for REPONSE. 
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Appendix Table 1. Means and standard deviations of key variables (employee sample 
2004) 
 
 n    France    
 mean sd min Max mean sd min max 
Employee individual voice supports 0.50 0.50 0 1 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Years of education  13.59 2.54 11 18 13.52 2.76 8 19 
Pay> average for my occupation  0.50 0.50 0 1 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Mgr/Professional  0.21 0.41 0 1 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Technician  0.13 0.34 0 1 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Admin/sales  0.27 0.44 0 1 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Semi/unskilled manual  0.29 0.45 0 1 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Other occupations - - - - 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Length of service (log)  1.29 1.17 -0.69 2.71 2.03 1.04 0 3.81 
Representative voice         
Union steward 0.32 0.46 0 1 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Estab level pay agreement  0.37 0.48 0 1 0.78  0.41  0 1 
Personnel delegate - - - - 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Combined PD/WC - - - - 0.13 0.34  0 1 
Employee consultation 0.43 0.49 0 1 - - - - 
Works council no agt - - - - 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Works council & local agt - - - - 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Local agt no works council - - - - 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Ma-gement-led voice         
Teams 0.85 0.36 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Quality circles 0.41 0.49 0 1 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Workplace meetings 0.87 0.33 0 1 0.86 0.35 0 1 
Appraisal scheme 0.76 0.38 0 1 0.70 0.40 0 1 
Grievance procedure 0.98 0.15 0 1 - - - - 
Grievances handled informally  0.26 0.44 0 1 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Job characteristics         
Job autonomy  0.55 0.24 0 1 0.37 0.29 0 1 
Use of computers  0.53 0.28 0.025 0.75 0.43 0.30 0 0.75 
Establishment characteristics         
Training intensity 0.59 0.28 0 1 0.50 0.24 0.17 1 
Plant pay > industry average  0.49 0.50 0 1 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Turnover rate/problems  0.14 0.15 0 1 0.62 0.48 0 1 
Absence rate/problems  0.04 0.05 0 0.77 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Means based on employee sample in Table 4, and use employee weights. 
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Appendix Table 2 Definitions of key variables 
 
Questi
onn-
aire 
Britain France 
Individual voice  EQ 
‘Ideally, who do you think 
would best represent you in 
dealing with managers here 
about getting increases in 
your pay?’ Response: 
Myself, Trade Union, 
Employee representative 
(non-union), Another 
employee, Somebody else 
Employees are able to 
defend their own interests 
directly; (Les salariés sont en 
mesure de défendre 
directement leurs intérêts) 
(Likert scale: disagree to 
agree strongly (Q 20). 
Satisfaction with pay EQ 
How satisfied are you with 
the amount of pay you  
receive? Response: Likert 
scale very dissatisfied to 
very satisfied. 
Overall, taking into account 
the effort you put in, do you 
consider that the firm 
recognizes your work at its 
true value? (Au final, 
compte tenu des efforts que 
vous faites, estimez-vous 
que l’entreprise reconnaît 
votre travail à sa juste 
valeur ?) Responses : yes 
entirely, yes, no, not at all. 
(Q14) 
Years of education  EQ Based on highest diploma Based on highest diploma 
Pay> average for my 
occupation  
EQ 
Weekly pay for individual 
compared with average for 
reported occupation 
Hourly pay for individual 
compared with average for 
reported occupation 
Occupation EQ 
Matched GB/F from one-
digit responses 
Matched GB/F from one-
digit responses 
Length of service 
(log)  
EQ Derived from ranges Derived from year of joining 
Personnel delegate MQ n/a 
Personnel delegate (délégué 
du personnel) 
Combined PD and 
WC 
MQ n/a 
Combined DP/WC 
representation (délégation 
unique) 
Works council MQ n/a Works council 
Consultation  MQ Consultative committee   n/a 
Union steward MQ Shop steward 
Union steward (délégué 
syndical) 
Estab level pay 
agreement  
MQ 
Existence of a local pay 
agreement 
Local pay agreement 
(redressé) negotiated in the 
last three years 
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Quest
-ionn-
aire 
Britain France 
Appraisal scheme  MQ 
Appraisal for some or all 
non-managerial employees 
Appraisal for some or all 
non-managerial employees 
Quality circles  MQ Use of quality circles Use of quality circles 
Workplace meetings  MQ Use of workplace meetings Use of workplace meetings 
Grievance procedure MQ  Formal grievance procedure n/a 
Grievances handled 
informally  
MQ 
Derived from whether 
grievances on conditions 
were reported & whether 
grievances had been taken 
through the formal 
procedure. 
Employees take problems 
first to senior management 
Teams  MQ 
Teams for majority of largest 
occupational group 
Teams for majority of largest 
occupational group 
Job autonomy  MQ 
Index based on problem-
solving, job discretion & 
control 
Index based on problem-
solving, job discretion & 
control 
Use of computers  MQ 
Share of employees using 
computers 
Share of employees using 
computers 
Training intensity  MQ 
Days of training in last year 
relative to mean 
Annual expenditure relative 
to mean 
Plant pay > industry 
average  
MQ 
Plant average pay > average 
for establishments in the 
same sector 
Plant average pay > average 
for establishments in the 
same sector 
Turnover 
rate/problems  
MQ Labor turnover rate 
Recruitment difficulties 
reported  for 2004 DIFRECR 
Absence 
rate/problems  
MQ 
Absence rate (provided by 
respondent) 
Was absence a problem in 
2004 for specified categories 
of employees? ABSCAD-
ABSOUV 
Employment size 
(log) 
MQ Number of employees Number of employees 
Economic sector MQ 
Sector of establishment, 9 
categories matched GB/F 
Sector of establishment, 9 
categories matched GB/F 
Key: EQ, MQ, employee or management questionnaire. LOG: largest occupational group. 
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Appendix Table 3. France: representative voice effects on individual voice in different 
sized workplaces  
 
 <50  50-149  150-  <50 50-149 >=150 
 Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  mean mean mean 
Perceived individual voice         0.48 0.38 0.33 
Employee individual voice factors          
Years of education  -0.005  - 0.006  - -0.027  ** 13.30 13.26 13.80 
Pay> average for my occupation  0.023  - -0.030  - -0.082  - 0.23 0.29 0.46 
Mgr/Professional  0.275  ** 0.350  **** 0.042  - 0.13 0.14 0.23 
Technician  -0.094  - 0.153  - -0.008  - 0.16 0.15 0.21 
Admin/sales  0.201  * 0.001  - -0.155  - 0.23 0.20 0.15 
Semi/unskilled manual  -0.108  - 0.104  - 0.067  - 0.16 0.20 0.16 
Other occupation  0.192  - 0.409  **** -0.099  - 0.08 0.07 0.05 
Length of service (log)  -0.004  - 0.033  - -0.032  - 1.84 1.98 2.17 
Representative voice channels          
Union steward -0.360  **** -0.123  - 0.132  - 0.23 0.60 0.90 
Personnel delegate 0.237  **** 0.361  *** -0.185  - 0.59 0.55 0.93 
Combined PD/WC -0.060  - 0.189  - 0.047  - 0.09 0.34 0.03 
Council & no agt -0.005  - -0.064  - 0.139  - 0.05 0.08 0.08 
Council with agt -0.117  - -0.216  - -0.033  - 0.14 0.41 0.85 
Agreement & no council 0.031  - 0.059  - -0.031  - 0.45 0.32 0.05 
Grievance handling          
Grievances handled informally  0.155  - 0.092  - 0.068  - 0.79 0.69 0.48 
Size dummies No  Yes  Yes     
Sector dummies Yes  Yes  Yes     
          
Pseudo r2 0.0328  0.0286  0.0188     
N 1622  2002  3499  1622 2002 3499 
Clusters 582  714  1223     
 
Probit estimates. Dependent variable: perceived individual voice. Robust standard errors, 
using establishments as clusters. Unit of observation: employees. With the exception of years 
of education and log service, for all variables, a mean of one is equivalent to 100% of 
employees covered. 
Significance: **** 1%; *** 2%; ** 5%; * 10%. 
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Appendix Table 4. Determinants of perceived employee individual voice: Comparative 
results for 1998 
Perceived individual 
voice 
Great 
Britain 
   France    
 Employ-
ees 
 Establish-
ments 
 Employ-
ees 
 Establish-
ments 
 
 Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  
Representative voice 
channels 
        
Job-level channels         
Union steward -0.336  **** -0.953  **** -0.704  ** -3.792  **** 
Personnel delegate     0.633  * 3.589  **** 
Union steward * size     0.116  * 0.744  **** 
Personnel delegate * size     -0.149  * -0.927  **** 
Workplace level channels         
Local / Estab pay 
agreement 
-0.335  **** -1.019  ****     
Council & no agt     0.783  - -2.859  - 
Council with agt     0.451  - 0.706  - 
Agreement & no council     0.703  - -0.273  - 
         
Interactions: size with 
Council/Agt status 
No  No  Yes ns Yes ns 
Size dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sector dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Pseudo R2 0.1783  0.3769  0.0367  0.272  
N 16329  966  5512  568  
Clusters 1015  Na  960  Na  
 
Notes: Dependent variable: perceived individual voice. Explanatory variables and probit 
estimation methods: as in the full regressions of Tables 4. Interactions between log size and 
agreement coverage in Britain were not significant, and so not included. They were included 
for France because of the more complex relationships between representative institutions and 
size. The first set of estimates for each country is based on individual employees, and the 
second set, on establishment means. To compute establishment means for perceived 
individual voice analysis was restricted to establishments with at least 5 employee 
respondents to the employee questionnaire. Significance: **** 1%; *** 2%; ** 5%; * 10% 
 
Source: WERS and Reponse 1998, private sector establishments with 20 or more employees.  
 
